
CSSF Women, Peace and Security Helpdesk

Assessment of Gender Equality and Awareness in Police / Security Forces in Conflict Contexts

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The Women Peace and Security Helpdesk, managed by Saferworld in partnership with Conciliation Resources, GAPS UK, University of Durham and Women International Peace Centre (WIPC), was established in December 2021 to increase capability across the UK Government on WPS policy and programming in order to make its work on conflict and instability more effective. If you work for the UK government and you would like to send a task request, please email us at wpshelpdesk@saferworld.org.uk. If you do not work for the UK government but have an enquiry about the helpdesk or this report, please email us at enquiries.wpshelpdesk@saferworld.org.uk

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Summary

This paper examines the evidence that increased gender awareness of security personnel via training and/or a greater presence of women in security forces can directly contribute to more gender responsive security provision. For this report, gender responsive security is defined as “security approaches that reflect and respond to women’s and girls’ different realities and needs, valuing their perspectives and respecting their experiences”.¹

The review concludes that the evidence base is limited and inconsistent on these questions, particularly for Mali and Niger (but also, to an extent, globally). There is better evidence for women’s positive effects on ‘operational effectiveness’ in general, than for gender responsive security specifically – these overlapping but distinct concepts are explained in the text. The context-specific evidence base was limited, so the report looks at evidence from other conflict-affected contexts (Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Lebanon, Cyprus, Afghanistan, and others) and even non-conflict affected contexts for certain points; and supplements the document review by interviews with people working in/on Mali and Niger on security sector reform. The report also draws on evidence from military and police forces in general, rather than a specific focus on military police. It analyses evidence about the effects of increased gender awareness and women’s presence under four areas of effects: community trust, gender-based violence (GBV) reporting and response, perceptions/interpretations of gender, and recruitment of women into uniformed security professions. These areas were selected on the basis that, firstly they represent how much of the available evidence is framed; secondly, they respond to the definition of gender-responsive security used in the paper (above) and to the [project] assumption that improving gender awareness and recruiting more women will improve responses to security needs, especially the needs of women. However, much of the available evidence is either anecdotal, or reflects small data samples that offer limited insights and analysis.² Evidence is much more complete for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions than for national militaries; peacekeeper testimonials form a large part of this evidence base, though other types of evidence are becoming available.

The review concludes that there is limited, inconsistent evidence that training and women’s recruitment/deployment interventions will deliver gender-responsive security in Mali and Niger; but crucially there is only a lack of definitive evidence that they ‘work’, rather than any evidence that they do not. The report recommends more systematic monitoring of gender awareness training and women’s recruitment/deployment interventions to close the evidence gap and highlights areas for further research.

Method

The report is based on secondary evidence review and nine supplementary interviews. The evidence review covered journal articles, think tank and NGO reports, and some ‘flagship’ documents produced by relevant multi-lateral agencies. Access to any specific databases, for example, the UN Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE) database, that may contain some relevant information was not possible for the review. The interviews were with women in security forces in Mali and Niger, or those supporting such women or working on gender equality.

Findings and analysis

Policy and conceptual background

Since the UN adopted resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in 2000, issues of gender awareness and equality in security forces have become more mainstreamed.³ Many states worldwide and international security institutions now publicly acknowledge the value of gender perspectives in the security sector, including greater women's participation.⁴ It is good to note at the outset that encouraging women's participation is a policy decision fully justified by women's fundamental rights to equal opportunity, and that evidence of positive effects on security is not necessary to 'earn' such a role. But in addition to this right, a conviction that gender perspectives and greater women's participation increase operational effectiveness has also grown. For example, a recent North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) report notes that "cross-cutting integration of the gender perspective is central for partnership frameworks to align NATO partners with its values and *to be truly effective at tackling current security issues*" [emphasis added].⁵

The review makes a distinction between two concepts: operational effectiveness and gender-responsive security. Operational effectiveness⁶ refers to the overall achievement of a security force's objectives or success in tackling security issues; gender responsive security is *any approach that reflects and responds to women's and girls' different realities and needs, valuing their perspectives and respecting their experiences*. Neither definition is universally accepted, however distinguishing them is useful for our review. Not all evidence that women's presence improves operational effectiveness is also evidence of greater gender responsive security. For example, searches of women may be easier for women security officers in contexts where physical contact between unrelated men and women is taboo (mentioned in Afghanistan,⁷ for example), but they are not necessarily in the spirit of respect of women's safety needs. Therefore, while *suggested* areas of effects of women's presence on operational effectiveness are wide (everything from better cordoning and searching of women, to less reliance on use of force to achieve objectives),⁸ the review concentrates on certain elements where there is both a body of evidence to assess and close relation to gender responsive security: community trust, responses to violence against women/sexual violence/GBV, further recruitment of women, and changes in perceptions of gender by both women and men.

Context-specific background

The numbers of women in security services is generally rising globally (see Figure 1),⁹ while figures for Mali and Niger are relatively low. The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) estimates that in Mali 12.4% of the national police is female,¹⁰ 7% of the army and 6% of the air force, less than 3% of the Gendarmerie, and 5% of the National Guard;¹¹ women started joining the armed forces in roughly the 1980s.¹² In Niger, percentage figures of women in the Niger Armed Forces (FAN) and the National Police (a force focused on urban areas and government buildings) are not available; but the proportion in the Gendarmerie (regular police) is about 7%, and roughly 4.5% of the National Guard.¹³ The low/absent figures indicate that in both these countries structural barriers to women who may want to join security forces remain strong.¹⁴ Across the Sahel, 2020 data shows that women represented just 6% of personnel in the G5 Sahel Programme police component, but none on the military side.¹⁵ Women account for 3.58% of the UN Peacekeeping Multidimensional Integrated

Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) military personnel, as well as 25% of individual police officers and 10.87% of formed police unit members in MINUSMA, which is very similar to global averages.¹⁶

The prevalence of gender training of any kind in Mali and Niger seems to be low – neither the police or armed forces in Mali provide specific training on gender issues and no information is available on mainstreaming in other training. One exception is for police working on the ‘GBV hotline’ in Mali, which functions as an informal GBV unit, for which focused training is given; GBV crimes are not covered in general training. For Mali Armed Forces, International Humanitarian Law trainings, which have components on gender, are organised with international partners. In Niger, there is no information on police training, but the armed forces offer frequent seminars on their sexual harassment policy.¹⁷ Mali is a troop contributing country for UN peacekeeping, and so there are some gender-focused elements of pre-deployment training,¹⁸ and (though not separately verified for this report) the same could be assumed for Niger as a troop contributing country.

Military: Kenya: 30%, Zimbabwe: 20%, Burundi: 0.46%
Police: English-speaking forces (median figure): 21.7%, up from est. 10% in 1990s
Military Police: NATO: 2% (Latvia) to 34% (Australia)
Peacekeeping: 4.8% military, 10.9% formed police units, 28% individual police officers

FIGURE 1: SELECTED COMPARATORS ON NUMBERS OF WOMEN IN SECURITY SERVICES GLOBALLY.

Effects on trust of communities

The literature frequently suggests that more gender awareness and the presence of more women helps build community trust in, and positive perceptions of, security services. There is a small and relatively consistent evidence base on this. In Liberia, post-conflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration policy led to more women successfully integrating into security forces, the effects of which included increased positive perceptions of the security forces by the population (and by male colleagues).¹⁹ These measures seem to have been successful after both women former-combatants, and women associated with armed forces and groups in non-combat and informal roles, were accepted for integration into security forces. There is another frequently referenced case from Liberia: that of the all-women UN peacekeeping formed police unit. Community feedback revealed positive perceptions and a reported feeling of safety.²⁰ An interview-based study in Afghanistan found that Afghan forces considered female soldiers (of any nationality) to be “more respected and respectful” within local communities.²¹

UN peacekeepers (military, police, and civilian) believe that more uniformed women “contributes to a better situational understanding of conflict contexts, higher reporting of SGBV, improved intelligence gathering, *better local legitimacy, increased civilian outreach*, a greater focus on GBV, and enhanced gender equality in the host country” [emphasis added] – 80% of survey respondents (comprising military, police, and civilian personnel who have served in UN peace operations and selected academic experts) in DRC, Lebanon, and Cyprus agreed with this perspective.²² Such evidence is naturally subject to bias of the respondent, particularly when it cannot be triangulated with feedback from affected people or through correlation analysis; however, the survey reporting is still an improvement on many documents that rely on peacekeeper personal testimony alone.²³ Perception surveys or focus group discussions that ask community members about who they trust do exist, including one for Mali, but responses are not always broken down by the respondent’s gender, they often don’t ask about differential treatment of men and women by security forces or analyse data this way, and they do not ask about separate perceptions of male and female security officers.²⁴

In Mali, MINUSMA was recently assessed as active in pursuing the gender specific needs of affected people. However, the proportion of women in MINUSMA is low (although average for UN peacekeeping; figures above) and the same assessment reported that MINUSMA interviewees felt the low presence of women in their forces was holding back their ability to both protect civilians and collect intelligence in certain areas where gender norms mean women rarely leave the home/private sphere (Gao province is mentioned).²⁵ Further specific studies on this question for Mali or Niger, either peacekeeping-related or on national security forces, were not uncovered in the research for this report, and so effects on gender-responsive security cannot be evidenced.

Effects on gender-based violence reporting and responses

Women and girls in the Central Sahel experience some of the highest rates of recorded GBV in the world.²⁶ The literature commonly mentions a possible advantage of women's presence – that victims of GBV, the majority of whom are women or girls, will feel more comfortable reporting to women security officers. There is some evidence globally for this. UN Women compiled data from 39 countries and found a positive correlation with the proportion of women in the police force in those countries and the rate of GBV reports (the level of correlation is not reported in the study).²⁷ A paper based on secondary data analysis found that a greater proportion of female personnel in UN peacekeeping missions is associated with a greater rate of reports of rape to peacekeeping units; and also a greater implementation of women's rights provisions of peace agreements.²⁸ This paper is atypical for the evidence, because it uses the UN data on women in peacekeeping missions, cross-analysed with the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset²⁹ and the Peace Accords Matrix implementation dataset³⁰ to do quantitative correlation analysis, rather than being qualitative or interview/testimony based. The case study of the all-women unit in Liberia makes reference to easier reporting for women, however no details or figures of GBV reporting are available in the reviewed sources.³¹

One report from the region, on police responses to GBV in Mauritania, found that gender responsive policing, including skills training on gender and GBV, had positive impacts on public perceptions of domestic violence and led to increased reporting of violence by women, as they felt more confident speaking with police women – or with policemen who better understood domestic violence.³² However, the report does not include detail on the method of how community perception was measured or changes in the level of reporting of violence against women/domestic violence. As neither Mali nor Niger does significant GBV-specific training for security forces, there is very little to assess the impact of such training, or of women officers, on GBV reporting and response. Mali's 'GBV hotline' could provide a good case study, however no formal study was uncovered by the report.³³

A subset of this frequent assumption in the literature (that women receive more (S)GBV reports and/or handle GBV cases better) is related to sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers. An ACCORD report conducted in collaboration with MINUSMA indicates that gender awareness training in Africa peace operations – including pre-deployment training of peacekeepers – contributed to reduced levels of SEA by peacekeepers in mission areas, where those peacekeepers had completed training and reported greater understanding of gender issues. Unfortunately, the source does not provide any data or detail about the method for how this conclusion was arrived at, so it is weak evidence. The same research also highlighted that “the reach and impact of gender-related initiatives [in the context of peacekeeping] are not well documented”.³⁴ The global progress study on WPS implementation addresses this question by noting that all SEA cases and scandals within UN peacekeeping have concerned male perpetrators.³⁵ This is an important issue for Mali and Niger as both countries have a record of credible reports of SEA and GBV by peacekeepers and national military.³⁶

Some of the documents reviewed for this report contend that women's presence is not only associated with more frequent reporting of GBV cases but also better handling of such cases. This review found no evidence for or against this, chiming with the findings of a recent review of Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), that "there is little data to back up the assumption that women are better than men at addressing CRSV".³⁷ The CRSV review observes that these assumptions "can perpetuate the idea that women's added value is their gender identity" whilst also doing "a disservice to men peacekeepers who might benefit from learning more about how to prevent and respond to CRSV".³⁸

Effects on perceptions/ interpretations of gender

There is little evidence that gender awareness training, and the presence of women security officers, can change perceptions of gender. A study of peacekeeping police training used a comparative method across four training courses and found that the effectiveness of the training was probably undermined by a lack of user-centred design, and a divergence between stated values and UN practice particularly on SEA – and notes weak monitoring and evaluation of training (this review has also struggled to find any training evaluation data).³⁹ Another conceptual study highlighted a narrow focus on sexual violence in training curricula and suggested that a focus on the value of gender awareness for operational effectiveness actually removes the chance for trainings to fundamentally challenge attitudes.⁴⁰ The review uncovered no Mali or Niger specific evidence on this particular question.

Perceptions and interpretations of gender also shape the available evidence base. Despite developments that have strengthened the links, and coherence, between gender and security sector reform (SSR) in theory and as increasingly evidenced in scholarly papers,⁴¹ from a practical point of view SSR has remained a concept operationalised mainly by and for men; as one interviewee said, "we get more and more attention in recent years, but this doesn't mean that our perspective is truly taken into account, let alone that gender is thought of holistically".⁴² The evidence base is also exclusively focused on binary definitions of gender (also relied on for this paper). Gender discourse in Niger and Mali seems overwhelmingly focused on the inclusion and participation of women, rather than concerning masculinity or other gender expressions or sexual identities. In the words of a security and gender expert interviewed for this report, "While [in the Sahel] there is a general acceptance in the two countries that women must play an important role in the security sector, LGBT+ rights and the impact of problematic interpretations of masculinity are still completely ignored, or perceived as belonging to external actors... security practitioners tell us that by wanting to discuss gender more widely, we impose a western view on them".⁴³ The interviewees in Mali did not wish to address the question (or could not), or commented that "LGBT+ rights are not important in the Sahel".⁴⁴

Effects on further recruitment of women and women's influence in security

There is little reliable evidence that gender awareness and women's presence can lead to further recruitment of women to security forces (whether this has onward effects for gender responsive security can be gauged in the sections above). The case of the Liberia women's formed police unit has been reported to have influenced later increased recruitment to the national police,⁴⁵ although the original historical case study on which this claim is based lays less emphasis on this unit and more on a targeted recruitment drive by champions within the Liberian National Police.⁴⁶ UN peacekeeping includes "inspiring and creating role models" as one of the reasons to support increased women's participation,⁴⁷ and some peacekeeper testimonials support the idea that they can act as role models.⁴⁸

However, the review found no evidence for Mali and Niger that this is the case, for national forces or peacekeeping.

Increased recruitment and retention of women may neither impact the institutional culture of security sector institutions in the Sahel nor, therefore, result in enhanced security for women. In fact, a small number of women recruited to or promoted within these institutions can be exposed to risk,⁴⁹ may not be in a position or inclined to promote gender issues, and will likely have to work harder than their male colleagues to succeed because of male networks and expectations.⁵⁰

This evidence, along with other studies and literature,⁵¹ indicates that while female participation in police, some national militaries and peacekeeping operations may now be comprehensive on paper, in practice there remain significant issues, including widely held cultural norms and structural barriers that limit the possibilities of potential women recruits. These include practicalities such as working hours, attendance requirements and time away from home that often do not reflect the level of responsibility women have in their homes. As a result, women face the daunting dilemma of choosing between becoming a mother, a spouse or a member of the military. A 2018 International Peace Institute study found that in UN operations as well as within national security force institutions “at the individual and community levels, military women are often seen as less feminine and less marriageable. Single women may be seen as promiscuous, while mothers are often perceived as neglecting their families”.⁵² In addition, there remains a “desperate shortage of literature on women’s experiences of peacekeeping and participation in military life”.⁵³

In terms of how women in Mali and Niger enter the security forces, the interviewees confirmed that most of them come from families with a military background and were already in contact with the security sector.⁵⁴ A 2011 study by DCAF on gender in national security and justice institutions in 14 West African countries, including Mali and Niger, found that a shared challenge to recruitment was the lack of development of policies and procedures to address sexual harassment. Such policies and procedures could contribute to a healthy and safe work environment, which largely depends on the culture within both military and police forces.⁵⁵ Researchers report that “these remain strongly male dominated institutions.”⁵⁶ Research by L’institute Malien de Recherche Action pour la Paix has highlighted the various necessary ways to encourage women to join Malian armed forces: get community buy-in; ensure recruitment opportunities are disseminated in local languages and through local media, such as community radio; and create better synergies between civil society organisations and security providers, in order to increase the diversity of women who are encouraged to join the armed forces.⁵⁷

The available evidence indicates a positive trend towards greater numbers of women in security forces globally, including in Mali and Niger. Further research on barriers to promotion and influence for women and/or barriers to more complete gender responsive approaches by men or women security force members would be needed to reveal more. Expected structural barriers are structural discrimination (e.g. women’s ‘double burden’ of domestic work and employment), lack of institutional support for uniformed women, and the influence of social and gender norms on their opportunities to thrive within armed forces. A woman Lieutenant of the Malian Army, and the only woman joining a regional pre-deployment training for senior army officers from the G5 Sahel countries, said in interview, “I do not understand why women[s] presence remains limited. In African armies, we have women becoming Generals, pilots, however, a lot is still to be done when it comes to gender equality.”⁵⁸

Analysis of the evidence and assumptions

Overall the evidence base on the effects of either gender awareness training or increased women's presence, especially on gender responsive security and especially in Mali and Niger, is severely limited. Conceptual and small sample qualitative studies dominate, the documentation is far better for peacekeeping than for any national force of conflict-affected countries, and even the peacekeeping evidence is based disproportionately on testimonials by peacekeepers – only recently have quantitative studies on perceptions of peacekeepers and correlation analysis emerged, and it seems that gaps in recordkeeping are restricting better analysis.⁵⁹ Gender researchers point out there remains a “desperate shortage of literature on women's experiences of peacekeeping and participation in military life”.⁶⁰ There is also a striking gap in studies on men's and women's perceptions of security forces (and equally, affected communities perceptions of men and women security officers), and what different women want and need in terms of gender responsive security. Some stronger evidence for the effects of women in the security services is Western-focused, and by now rather old (dating from the 1980s and 1990s). There is very little on Mali and Niger specifically, unsurprising given the lack of gender focus in the national forces, reflected in minimal training in this area – but given that security support programmes with partners have been running in the region for several years, there may be a wealth of non-publicly available data through monitoring and evaluation (however, this is speculative).

There is a Western-focused part of the evidence base,⁶¹ even though there is not a high level of variance among the numbers and functions of women in Western and non-Western security forces.⁶² Further, much of the evidence base, especially from police, is from non-conflict-affected environments, whether Western or non-Western. These studies tend to have more complete statistical reporting, and may have erroneously influenced assumptions about effects in conflict-affected non-Western countries, though this is conjecture based on the earlier creation of this evidence (1980s, 1990s).

There is a lack of data around targeted gender training for security providers, including in the context of Sahel military police units, which limits the opportunities for analysis of whether these types of interventions can have sustained impacts on encouraging security providers (the overwhelming majority of whom are men) to be more gender responsive. There is little available evidence, including feedback from uniformed women, on whether such trainings affect men's attitudes towards women joining them in the armed forces or the possible effects on the physical and sexual harassment of women, which is long-recorded in security services internationally.⁶³ Similarly with the greater presence of women, there is little research on whether the global trend of more women being recruited into armed forces is actually changing attitudes and challenging structural discrimination against women within armed forces; let alone research on the effects of gender responsive security on communities.

The assumption that women actually want to join armed forces (and that interventions to encourage them to do so are therefore worth investing in) is another area that needs more evidence. In the context of Mali and Niger, the security forces, which are seen on the one hand as potentially predatory against women (as well as high risk professions in a deteriorating security landscape), but on the other hand as offering job security in fragile economies, require in-depth research.⁶⁴ The current status quo of assumptions that are poorly evidenced poses significant challenges for the success of reform of the security sector in general, and more specifically for the realisation of the WPS agenda in the Sahel.

Finally, pulling apart what ‘operational effectiveness’ actually means is necessary in order to gather better evidence on gender responsive security. Women's organisations, such as Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, point out that initiatives to increase gender awareness in security providers, and to protect civilians, sometimes operate on the assumption that this approach will improve combat or operational effectiveness, as opposed to being focused on a gender transformation

objective. They note that “women have been added to the policy mix, but there is a chronic lack of any robust transformative approach”.⁶⁵ This is backed by other studies, including research on the risk of women’s rights being instrumentalised in order to improve counterterrorism responses and to combat violent extremism in Mali.⁶⁶ It seems clear that gender norms have shaped both the policy discourse and evidence base on these questions; for example, the weak evidence base that women will handle GBV cases better than men colleagues contrasts sharply with the frequency of this assumption or inference in the documents reviewed.

Conclusions

In conclusion, there is limited and inconsistent evidence globally that gender awareness training improves gender responsive security or that a greater presence of women in security services does so. The evidence base for Mali and Niger in particular is severely limited. There is more consistent evidence that women in security forces improve operational effectiveness, particularly in improving the ability to interact with women in the community, with some evidence that this leads to greater trust. However, the distinction between operational effectiveness and gender responsive security is important here. It is strongly recommended that future gender-responsive security programme pay more attention to monitoring and evaluating training projects through tools developed by national gender experts, as well as independent impact studies based upon quantitative data, comparative case studies and perception or feedback studies from conflict-affected men and women.

Recommendations

- a) Invest in research on how gender sensitivity measures, particularly training, affect attitudes and behaviour in the medium to long term; context specific research that focuses on national militaries rather than on peacekeeping is needed. These should be conducted by gender experts.
- b) Consider the exact content of ‘gender trainings’. Training programmes that are not based on a gender responsive Theory of Change may have limited potential to support gender responsive security, and be at risk of instrumentalising women to further security aims that may actually be harmful to women’s safety (counterterrorism or operational expansion).
- c) Further research could fill gaps. Perception studies, which should have equal numbers of affected men and women, could ask about their perception of security services generally and women officers specifically; these could include secondary analysis of existing datasets, for example, the ‘Talking Peace’ series of surveys (see references). Also, investigate whether UN peacekeeping records such as incident report forms or SAGE information can be cross-checked by gender, for example, from the reporting officer.
- d) Establish a series of confidence-building and mentoring mechanisms for women who wish to be recruited into Sahelian police and security forces, to support them and to encourage the creation of women-led networks, with support for women based upon consultations with women about what would be most useful.
- e) Consider global evidence about sexual harassment, assault and bullying within security services to help design supportive functions for women entering the security forces in Mali and Niger. This could include ensuring the presence of dedicated gender focal points in all military and police units who are mandated to support women recruits, with clear lines of communication and transparent processes. This could connect with gender training efforts (see 1, above).

References

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- ³ Subsequent UNSC Resolutions particularly build on this. UNSCR 2242 (in 2015) emphasised gender-responsive training in the military and police units of UN peacekeeping operations, <http://peacewomen.org/SCR-2242>; while UNSCR 2467 repeated the need for stronger military justice mechanisms to address sexual violence in armed conflict and to tackle institutional immunity <https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/SCR2467.pdf>; as well as the Office of the NATO Secretary General Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, (2020), *Women, Peace and Transforming Security*, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/10/pdf/201110-wps-essay-transforming-security-e.pdf.
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- ⁶ Many reports that mention operational effectiveness do not define it. Nagel et al. break it down, for peacekeeping operations, into: reduced battlefield deaths, reduced civilian victimisation, operational efficiency (meeting objectives), and impacts on politics and people. The report acknowledges that this last element is often neglected in the literature, especially in any focus on women and communities. Nagel, R., Fin, K., Maenza, J. (2021) *Gendered Impacts on Operational Effectiveness of UN Peace Operations*, Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security <https://giwps.georgetown.edu/resource/gendered-impacts-on-operational-effectiveness-of-un-peace-operations>.
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- ⁸ Operational effectiveness improvements from women’s presence, and to a lesser extent gender awareness, catalogued for this review included: greater trust of civilians; more involvement of local women; superior communication and crowd control skills; and, in the context of peacekeeping missions, screening of female ex-combatants; widened intelligence networks; cordoning and searching of women; and assisting in aftermath of sexual violence; Valasek, K. (2008), *Security sector reform and gender*, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, OSCE/ODIHR/UN-INSTRAW; UN peacekeeping data page.
- ⁹ Sources for Figure 1: Military figures: Bouka, Y. and Sigsworth, R. *Women in the military in Africa: Kenya case study*, Institution for Security Studies, East Africa Report 7, 2016; Police figures: Prenzler, Tim and Sinclair, Georgina (2013). *The status of women police officers: an international review*. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 41(2) pp. 115–131; Military Police figures NATO, 2019, *Summary of the National Reports: of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives* https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/9/pdf/NCGP_Full_Report_2019.pdf; Peacekeeping figures UN Peacekeeping reporting <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/women-peacekeeping#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20out%20of%20approximately,personnel%20in%20UN%20Peacekeeping%20missions>, and Nagel et al (2021).
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List of interviewees

1. Female police officer – Niamey – high rank
2. Female gendarme – Niamey – mid rank
3. Male gendarmerie – Niamey – high rank
4. Female police officer – Agadez – low rank
5. DCAF gender officer – Geneva (online)
6. Female journalist working on gender – Niamey
7. Focus group gendarmerie (5 men, low/mid rank) – Agadez
8. EUCAP official gender training – Niamey
9. EUCAP gender training – Bamako (online)